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MODELS OF REGULATION 
James V. DeLong* 
THE POLITICS OF REGULATION. Edited by James Q. Wilson. 
New York: Basic Books. 1980. Pp. xii, 468. $18.95. 
In some ways, The Politics of Regulation is a bit shapeless. It has 
chapters by nine separate authors on nine different regulatory pro-
grams loosely grouped into three categories: "Traditional Regula-
tion: Rates and Entry''; "Regulation of Competitive Practices"; and 
"The 'New' Regulation: Products and Processes."1 While an intro-
duction and tenth chapter on "The Politics of Regulation" by the 
editor, the eminent Harvard political scientist James Q. Wilson, pro-
vide some useful synthesis and interpretation, the overall approach 
remains diffuse. The editor himself acknowledges that the "agencies 
covered . . . [were] selected by no particular plan" (p. xi). The indi-
vidual segments are uniformly well-written, easy to read, and even 
- for a connoisseur of the administrative process - entertaining, 
but one is often uncertain why a particular issue receives so much 
attention and another none at all, or how an individual chapter fits 
into any framework for the book as a whole. Nor is this an "impor-
tant" work in the sense that it presents startling new data or original 
hypotheses about regulation. Professor Wilson's themes derive from 
prior political science work (including his own, of course), and the 
individual chapters are too unsystematic and idiosyncratic to be to-
tally convincing unless one is predisposed to be convinced. 
Nonetheless, The Politics of Regulation deserves a thoughtful 
reading by any lawyer involved in the regulatory process, whether as 
regulator, practitioner, academician, or judge, because its analysis 
* Member of the District of Columbia Bar. A.B. 1960, Harvard College; J.D. 1963, 
Harvard Law School. This Review was written while the author was Research Director of the 
Administrative Conference of the United States, and the author wishes to thank the Confer-
ence for its support. The opinions expressed herein are solely those of the author. - Ed. 
1. The specific programs covered are Traditional Regulation: Rates and Entry (which in-
cludes chapters on State Regulation of Electric Utilities, The Federal Maritime Commission, 
and The Civil Aeronautics Board), Regulation of Competitive Practices (which includes chap-
ters on The Antitrust Division of the Department of Justice and The Federal Trade Commis-
sion), and The ''New'' Regulation: Products and Processes (which includes chapters on The 
Food and Drug Administration, The Occupational Safety and Health Administration, The 
Environmental Protection Agency, and The Office for Civil Rights). 
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leads inexorably to some serious and long overdue questions about 
the state of contemporary administrative law. 
To explain why this is so requires some setting of the stage. 
I 
The term "model" tends to create an image of an elaborately 
programmed computer spitting printouts, and, of course, a mathe-
matical model relying on computer capability is one example of the 
genre. Actually, the word has a far broader meaning. A model is "a 
simplified representation of some aspect of the real world, . . . the 
purposeful reduction of a mass of information to a manageable size 
and shape."2 An organization chart is a model of an institution and 
a work-flow chart a model of its internal processes. So, too, a model 
can be a verbal description of how an organization, including a fed-
eral agency, functions; any description contains, explicitly or implic-
itly, a whole series of simplifying assumptions about the purposes of 
the organization and its members, and about their interactions with 
each other and the outside world. A model highlights the important 
features of a situation or class of situations and eliminates the ir-
relevancies and details. It is a truism that everyone thinks in terms 
of models, whether they know it or not, and that how well a model 
reflects the relevant dimensions of the real world is a crucial determi-
nant of its utility for any analysis of real problems. 
Much of administrative law is based on a particular model of the 
administrative process handed down from the Progressive Era and 
the New Deal. In this model, agencies function as neutral profes-
sional administrators that apply some complicated and almost mysti-
cal expertise to promote congressionally mandated goals.3 As 
Professor Richard Stewart has observed, the model is based on the 
presumption that an administrator enjoys little real discretion be-
cause "[t]he policy to be set is simply a function of the goal to be 
achieved and the state of the world, ... [and] persons subject to the 
administrator's control are no more liable to his arbitrary will than 
are patients remitted to the care of a skilled doctor."4 Even when it 
is conceded that the administrator has more free will than allowed 
by this characterization, the dominant image is still one of a neutral 
expert working toward an undefinable but presumptively attainable 
goal of "the public interest." 
2. E. STOKEY & R. ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 8 (1978). 
3. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. REv. 1667, 
1671-88 (1975) (collecting sources). 
4. Id. at 1678. 
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From this model flow several doctrinal consequences, including 
the presumption of agency expertise, the importance of deference to 
agency decisions, the virtual unreviewability of an agency's policy 
choices, the idea that the decision-making process within an agency 
should remain a closed box and the mind of the collective adminis-
trator unprobed, the assumption that an agency can be relied upon 
to make disinterested judgments about how best to build a record, 
and the inapplicability of such litigation-based concepts as ex parte 
communications, bias, and prejudgment. 
The problem with the model is that no respectable thinker 
outside the legal profession, and few within - including the judges 
who use it every day - think that it adequately approximates real-
ity. Since its heyday in the 1930s, it has been undermined by "the 
complexities of a managed economy in a welfare state, and . . . the 
corrosive seduction of welfare economics and pluralist political anal-
ysis .... "5 This inadequacy has become manifest even in the 
traditional areas of regulation where an agency exercises broad dis-
cretion over a closely bounded area of the economy, such as rail-
roads and trucks, airlines, or telecommunications. In the areas that 
have been subjected to explosive regulatory growth over the past 
fifteen years - the environment, safety and health, and consumer 
protection - this inadequacy increasingly slides over into absurd-
ity. 6 Today, various agencies exercise tremendous power over mil-
lions of individual decisions in all sections of the economy, and no 
sensible person believes that this power is exercised in a spirit of 
neutral, disinterested technical expertise. 7 
In place of the model of the agency as Platonic Guardian there is 
now a varied collection of half-competitive, half-complementary 
models. Observers of the administrative process now speak of agen-
cies captured by industry and agencies captured by clientele groups; 
of "iron triangles," each composed of an agency, an interest group, 
and a congressional committee; of bureaucrats who maximize bud-
gets ( or power, or future income, or security) and Congressmen who 
maximize votes; of the economics of collective action and the theory 
of political coalitions; of agencies as stakeholders for competing spe-
cial interests; of market failures and their mirror image, the 
5. Id. at 1683. 
6. See, e.g., DeLong, Informal Rulemaking and the Integration of Law and Policy, 65 VA. L. 
REv. 257, 276-78 (1979). 
7. See, e.g., B. ACKERMAN & W. HAsSLER, CLEAN COAL/DIRTY AIR (1981) (the book is 
subtitled, "How the Clean Air Act Became a Multibillion-Dollar Bail-Out for High-Sulfur 
Coal Producers and What Should Be Done About It"). 
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systematic failures of non.market mechanisms; of organizational in-
centive structures; of the bureaucratic territorial imperative; and, 
finally, probably of other concepts that have not crossed this re-
viewer's desk.8 No one knows what model (or, more likely, what 
collection of models) of administrative action should replace the 
traditional one, but there is universal agreement that the old one is 
inoperative. 
The erosion of the intellectual base of New Deal-style adminis-
trative law does not necessarily mean that the original "doctrinal 
consequences" no longer apply. Even if one believes that much 
agency expertise is a legal fiction, one can still take the view that a 
marginally expert agency that has studied a problem should not be 
overruled by an even less expert court. One can be concerned about 
capture of an agency by the interests that it is supposed to regulate 
and still regard the requirement of an adequate articulation of the 
basis for decision as a sufficient check. One can think that agency 
decision-making needs scrutiny and reform without wanting to open 
all of an agency's confidential files to discovery requests by the janis-
saries of the Washington bar. Most fundamentally, one can be cer-
tain that federal agencies' policy decisions need more rigorous 
oversight, review, and coordination without concluding that a court 
of appeals is the proper body to exercise this function.9 Thus, there 
are some excellent reasons, aside from the natural inertia of any sys-
tem built on precedent, for being reluctant to abandon traditional 
principles. 
But if the presumptions supporting New Deal-style administra-
tive law are not necessarily wrong, they are not necessarily right ei-
ther, and at the very least the answers no longer come automatically. 
Browsing through the administrative law cases of the past ten years 
gives one a sense of the tension created by the dissonance between 
the conventional wisdom of the classic model and the courts' own 
8. For an excellent synopsis of the development of these theories, see Schuck, Book Re-
view, 90 YALE LJ. 702 (1981) (reviewing The Politics of Regulation). Another interesting 
work, and a rich bibliographical source, is P. Aranson, The Uncertain Search for Regulatory 
Reform (1978) (Working Paper No. 79-3, Law and Economics Center, University of Miami 
School of Law). 
9. The judges seem to agree. On July 20, 1981, the Judicial Conference sent a letter to the 
Congress expressing concern about the degree to which pending regulatory reform legislation 
would increase the authority and responsibility of the courts with regard to Federal Regula-
tion. See Legal Times of Washington, July 27, 1981, at 20, col. 1. In an interesting innovation, 
California has created an Office of Administrative Law within the Governor's Office to review 
agency regulations and reject those that are unnecessary, unauthorized, incomprehensible, or 
inconsistent with other extant laws. See M. PRICE, EXECUTIVE CONTROL OF RULEMAKINO: 
THE OFFICE OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN CALIFORNIA (1981) (Available from the Administra-
tive Conference of the United States, Washington, D.C.) 
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appraisals of governmental realities. 10 Indeed, this reviewer has ar-
gued elsewhere that the hybrid rule-making doctrines developed in 
the 1970s were a creative effort to resolve this tension. 11 The disso-
nance also creates many problems for the bar. While these are less 
easy to document, in talking to Washington lawyers one is struck by 
the distinction between the realities of dealing with agencies and 
counselling clients, and the formal requirements of administrative 
law as a self-contained; logical system.12 
Nor has the academic legal community been happy with the situ-
ation. Scholars accepted the hybrid rule-making cases surprisingly 
quickly, 13 most probably because they would have welcomed almost 
any effort to bring legal doctrine more into line with perceived 
reality. 
Although Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Re-
sources .Defense Council, Inc. 14 has placed in doubt the continuing 
validity of the hybrid rule-making cases, the underlying pressure for 
change still exists, and is finding a number of outlets. During the 
past fifteen years, Congress has enacted many statutes requiring par-
ticular procedures and processes in rule-making;15 three successive 
Presidents have promulgated reform-minded Executive Orders;16 
and more ge.neral regulatory reform legislation seems imminent. It 
is clear that legal change has come and will continue, but its exact 
direction and the implicit or explicit models of regulation on which it 
will be based remain uncertain. 
II 
It is this context of tension and change that should make the Poli-
tics of Regulation interesting to the legal profession, particularly be-
cause the authors are concerned more with description than 
10. See, e.g., Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir.) (en bane) (various opinions setting 
forth contrasting views about the EPA), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976). 
11. See DeLong, supra note 6,passim. 
12. For one practicing lawyer's candid views of an agency with which he was embroiled, 
see R. Wald, After the Hearing is Over (Speech for the Practicing Law Institute's Conference 
on FfC Rulemaking Procedures and Practice, Washington, D.C., Mar. 8, 1977). 
13. See Scalia, Vermont Yankee: The APA, the .D.C Circuit, and the Supreme Court, 1978 
SUP. CT. REV. 345. 
14. 435 U.S. 519 (1978). For contrasting views on the impact of this case, compare Scalia, 
supra note 13, with DeLong, supra note 6, at 309-19. 
15. See, DeLong, supra note 6, at 275-76 (collecting sources). 
16. President Reagan: Exec. Order No. 12,291, 46 Fed. Reg. 13,193 (1981); President 
Carter: Exec. Order No. 12,044, 43 Fed. Reg. 12,661 (1978); President Ford: Exec. Order No. 
11,821, 39 Fed. Reg. 41,501 (1974). · 
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abstraction, and with effective communication rather than academic 
jargon. In Professor Wilson's words: 
[T]he authors conferred on the scope, organization, and style of the 
essays to ensure that they would address some common issues: how 
the agency was created and its fundamental legislation passed; what 
the agency normally does (how it defines its task); what major contro-
versies have erupted over its rule-making or rule-enforcing procedures; 
and how one might best explain the agencies' preference for one course 
of action rather than another. All these agencies exercise discretionary 
authority, some under statutes so vague as to provide little more than a 
general hunting license. The authors are interested in competing theo-
ries about why an agency uses its discretion in one way rather than 
another. [P. xii.] 
Thus, the book is about politics in the broad sense - the interaction 
of ideas, interests, and expectations in the society at large, in Con-
gress, and in the agencies that determine "how goals [are] deter-
mined, conflict resolved or managed, standards set, and policy 
enforced" (p. xi). 
Since, as the title implies, the book is an analytic survey of "the 
politics of regulation," rather than a narrowly designed monograph 
with a specific thesis, neither the book as a whole nor Professor Wil-
son's final essay reaches any overarching conclusions. Wilson finds 
conventional capture theory - the view that regulatory outcomes 
are determined by the interests of the regulated - much too simplis-
tic, and the thought that this would probably tum out to be the case 
seems to have been a primary motive for writing the book (pp. 357-
63). But Wilson does not attempt to replace capture theory with an 
explanation of his own because, as he notes in the conclusion, "[a] 
single-explanation theory of regulatory politics is about as helpful as 
a single explanation of politics generally, or of disease" (p. 393). 
Nonetheless, because Wilson does identify a number of recurring 
problems, as well as new ways of analyzing them, the book is filled 
with intriguing insights into the realities of the administrative 
process. 
Some of his insights remain fairly abstract. Professor Wilson's 
"most distinctive contribution to regulatory theory,"17 according to 
one scholar, is his emphasis on the kinds of regulatory politics that 
arise under different distributions of costs and benefits in a particular 
sector of the economy. When both costs and benefits are widely dis-
tributed among the populace, a different regulatory structure is pro-
duced than when they are narrowly concentrated in identifiable 
groups. Still other structures are produced when costs are widely 
17. Schuck, supra note 8, at 717. 
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distributed and benefits concentrated, or costs concentrated and ben-
efits diffused. Wilson labels the types of interactions resulting from 
these four situations as, respectively: (I) Majoritarian politics; 
(2) Interest group politics; (3) Client politics; and (4) Entrepreneurial 
politics (pp. 366-69).18 
The book also discusses a number of more immediately practical 
issues, though many are touched on only briefly. For example, a 
recurring theme is the importance of the norms and standards of var-
ious professions - law (pp. 46, 173-78), economics (pp. 166-73), 
health and safety consulting (pp. 250-51 ), engineering (p. 36), and so 
on - in determining how an agency actually carries out its tasks. 
The idea of capture, whether by industry or by client groups, natu-
rally receives attention, again with emphasis on the specific context 
under discussion (pp. 62-68, 328-38). The book also seeks to explain 
at least some regulatory politics in terms of the considerations that 
originally led to the creation of a given agency or program. An 
agency's early history, the authors find, can often affect its develop-
ment years later (pp. 79-90). 
An agency's development can be further influenced by the atti-
tudes of its staff members - whether they identify their careers and 
rewards with the agency, hope to use it as a springboard to better 
things, or regard other members of a professional group as their sig-
nificant reference point (pp. 372-82). Federal officials, moreover, are 
often primarily concerned with avoiding catastrophe, and the opera-
tional definition of "catastrophe" can profoundly affect an agency's 
decisions. 19 Almost as important as avoiding catastrophe is avoiding 
ridicule, since doing something silly or something that lends itself to 
easy caricature can make opponents out of people who normally 
have little interest in the agency's activities (pp. 375-76).20 Professor 
Wilson notes that fear of catastrophe or ridicule often produces rules 
dealing with even the remotest contingencies. He comments: 
Critics of regulatory agencies notice this proliferation of rules and sup-
18. Professor Schuck raises a crucial question about this typology: What about the com-
mon situation where no one knows how the costs and benefits are going to be distributed? Id. 
at 718-19. 
19. For example, to an FDA official a drug catastrophe is thalidomide babies, or approval 
of something that turns out to have carcinogenic effect, however slight, rather than the deaths 
of patients who might ( or might not) have been saved by a drug that has not yet been approved 
by the FDA. To the CAB or the FMC the catastrophe to be feared has been the bankruptcy of 
a major carrier, not the consumer loss caused by lack of competition and inflated rates. Pp. 
375-76. 
20. OSHA got into more trouble for requiring split toilet seats and for publishing a booklet 
warning farmers about the dangers of slipping on manure than for any of its more important 
actions. The EPA would not seriously consider imposing effluent charges for fear of the tag 
that it was "selling licenses to pollute." Pp. 376-77. 
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pose that it is the result of the "imperialistic" or expansionist instincts 
of bureaucratic organizations. Though there are such examples, I am 
struck more by the defensive, threat-avoiding, scandal minimizing in-
stincts of these agencies. [Pp. 377-78.) 
An agency can appear most power hungry, in other words, precisely 
when it is acting most defensively. 
Bureaucratic politics, finally, can provide only an incomplete ex-
planation for much of what agencies do. The Politics of Regulation 
consistently emphasizes the importance of ideas in regulatory policy-
making (pp. 393-94). However influential the interplay of material 
interests, it takes place in a context of attitudes and ideas that have 
an important role in determining the nature of the ultimate deci-
sions. ''To the extent an agency can choose, its choices will be im-
portantly shaped by what its executives learned in college a decade 
or two earlier'' (p. 393). 
Professor Wilson could have added that this makes the effort to 
understand the politics of the regulatory process one that by defini-
tion can never be completed. The very existence of any model that 
achieves intellectual currency will itself affect the process in ways 
that will in tum require the construction of new models, which will 
affect the process, and so on. No one could deny, for example, that 
the development and acceptance of capture theory has itself had a 
tremendous impact on the regulatory politics of the 1960s and 
1970s.21 It seems almost inevitable that some of the newer theories, 
such as those based on bureaucratic self-interest or on Professor Wil-
son's four-cell matrix, will similarly affect regulatory politics in the 
future. 
III 
For the administrative lawyer, the question remains: What do I 
get out of the book besides a Sunday's entertainment and a few war 
stories? Does it change my behavior on Monday morning? The an-
swer is that it probably should. At least it should change the way 
that the lawyer thinks about the administrative process on Monday 
morning, and this is likely to change his behavior on Tuesday, be-
cause thinking in terms of the broad political and bureaucratic con-
siderations discussed in the book creates new insights into legal 
problems. 
This point is best argued by illustration, and a good vehicle is the 
1979 case, Association of National Advertisers, Inc. v. FTC.22 In 
21. See, e.g., Schuck, supra note 8, at 706-07. 
22. 627 F.2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 921 (1980). 
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1978, the FTC started a rule-making proceeding looking toward re-
strictions on television advertising directed at children. Before the 
proceeding had begun, Chairman Michael Pertschuk had made 
speeches and written letters strongly indicating that he believed such 
advertising was indeed unfair under the vague standards of section 5 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act.23 One could reasonably draw 
the conclusion from his statements that he regarded the impending 
proceeding as a device to provide the formal underpinnings for this 
conclusion, not as an open inquiry into the desirability of his policy 
choice. 
The advertisers sued to disqualify Pertschuk on the grounds of 
bias and prejudgment. They used two basic arguments. First, Con-
gress has mandated {hat FTC rule-making proceedings incorporate 
such special devices as oral hearings, opportunities for cross-exami-
nation and rebuttal, and detailed statements of basis and purpose. 
This, the advertisers said, made the proceedings "adjudicative" or 
"quasi-adjudicative," and thus subject to the normal standards ap-
plicable in ariy judicial proceeding. These standards would rather 
clearly proscribe the statements made. And second, even if a looser 
standard were applied, the Chairman had shown sufficient bias to be 
disqualified. 24 
The advertisers lost. Concerning the first argument, the court 
noted that FTC rule-making was designed to produce a legislative 
judgment about wise policy, and that the mere engrafting of some 
quasi-judicial procedural limitations on the FTC's powers in no way 
affected the essentially legislative character of the agency's mandate. 
Concerning the second, the court emphasized that policy-making ad-
ministrators cannot act like neutral adjudicators; they must debate 
issues, muster political support, and shape the agency's agenda. 
Before proposing a rule, the Commissioners must necessarily reach 
some tentative conclusions, even if they change their minds after the 
full hearing. A Commissioner should be disqualified, the court con-
cluded, only upon a "clear and convincing showing that [he] has an 
unalterably closed mind on matters critical to the disposition of the 
proceeding."25 Pertschuk.'s statements were not strong enough to fall 
under the rule. 
Thus far, the decision seems unexceptionable. The argument 
that rule-making is not really rule-making is extremely tenuous; the 
23. 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(l) (1976). 
24. 627 F.2d at 1158. 
25. 627 F.2d at 1170. 
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attempt to impose constitutional due process requirements on rule-
making has been rejected by the Supreme Court;26 and the conten-
tion that an FTC Chairman should have no opinions on the applica-
bility of the statute that he is required to enforce is far-fetched. 
Nonetheless, if one thinks in Professor Wilson's terms, one sees 
another, more respectable, dimension to the advertisers' case. The 
plaintiffs focused only on Pertschuk's responsibility to vote on any 
final rule and on whether his statements indicated that he could not 
carry out this function fairly. Viewed this way, the court seems 
clearly right; the fact that a Chairman thinks the evidence in a full-
scale proceeding will come out in a particular way is not an adequate 
ground to assume that he will refuse to listen to arguments that it has 
come out differently. But Pertschuk has another bureaucratic role in 
addition to that of decision-maker. He is the hierarchical chief of a 
large staff whose future promotions and career prospects depend on 
his good will. One of the most iron laws of bureaucratic survival is 
that one does not leave one's boss hanging out to dry in an unsup-
portable position, or get into a situation where the newspapers will 
write, "FTC staff says its Chairman shot his mouth off without 
knowing what he was talking about." Even if the Chairman could 
have heard contradictory evidence with an open mind, simply by 
committing himself publicly to a position from which it would be 
embarrassing to retreat he ensured that his staff had strong disincen-
tives to develop any such contradictory evidence. Since in the FTC 
system most information is filtered through the staff,27 it was thus 
unlikely that he - or any of the other Commi~ioners, for that mat-
ter - would ever be exposed to it at all. According to this analysis, 
the real problem in determining the proper standard of disqualifica-
tion concerned the impact on the organization, not on the Chairman 
himself. 
That this argument would have won for the advertisers is doubt-
ful; it is a little too unfamiliar. But it is a better argument than any 
they had, and, more importantly from the standpoint of their long-
term strategic interests, the need to answer it might have caused the 
FTC to examine, and possibly change, its own internal incentive 
structures. 
Another illustration from a totally different context provides an 
26. Most recently in Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Resources Defense 
Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519 (1978). 
27. See generally B. Boyer, Trade Regulation Rulemaking Procedures of the Federal 
Trade Commission (May 1979 & June 1980) (A Report to the Administrative Conference of 
the United States, Washington, D.C.). 
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interesting contrast. In the current debates over regulatory reform 
legislation, some private groups seem convinced that procedural 
changes will solve their problems, that adding cross-examination or 
requirements for more elaborate written justification will change the 
way that agencies approach their regulatory tasks. In some cases this 
hope seems ephemeral because it represents an effort to find proce-
dural solutions to substantive problems. If an agency is forbidden to 
consider costs, for example, no amount of cross-examination is going 
to improve its cost-benefit analysis. Equally serious, though, is that 
it also represents an effort to find procedural solutions to political 
problems. If an agency thinks that it should redistribute wealth to 
the clientele group from which it derives its political support, requir-
ing it to jump through some extra procedural hoops may slow it 
down a little, at least until it learns the game, but is unlikely to have 
any very permanent impact. The real question, according to the 
kind of analysis undertaken in The Politics of Regulation, may be 
how to shift the internal incentive structures or the external political 
context to change the nature of the pressures on agency personnel. 
One could find a number of other examples from other cases and 
contexts, but these two are sufficient to make the basic point: The 
explicit use of some of the models of agency behavior that are being 
developed by the political scientists, economists, and organization 
theorists can provide some new insights into legal problems. This is 
enough to justify saying that The Politics of Regulation is not only an 
interesting book but a useful one as well. 
